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Abstract
Background: Diagnosis is the traditional basis for decision-making in clinical practice. Evidence is often lacking
about future benefits and harms of these decisions for patients diagnosed with and without disease. We propose
that a model of clinical practice focused on patient prognosis and predicting the likelihood of future outcomes
may be more useful.
Discussion: Disease diagnosis can provide crucial information for clinical decisions that influence outcome in
serious acute illness. However, the central role of diagnosis in clinical practice is challenged by evidence that it does
not always benefit patients and that factors other than disease are important in determining patient outcome. The
concept of disease as a dichotomous ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is challenged by the frequent use of diagnostic indicators with
continuous distributions, such as blood sugar, which are better understood as contributing information about the
probability of a patient’s future outcome. Moreover, many illnesses, such as chronic fatigue, cannot usefully be
labelled from a disease-diagnosis perspective. In such cases, a prognostic model provides an alternative framework
for clinical practice that extends beyond disease and diagnosis and incorporates a wide range of information to
predict future patient outcomes and to guide decisions to improve them. Such information embraces non-disease
factors and genetic and other biomarkers which influence outcome.
Summary: Patient prognosis can provide the framework for modern clinical practice to integrate information from
the expanding biological, social, and clinical database for more effective and efficient care.
Keywords: Clinical decision-making, Contested diagnoses, Diagnosis, Evidence-based medicine, Information,
Outcomes of care, Overdiagnosis, Prognosis, Stratified medicine
Background
The traditional model of clinical practice incorporates
diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment [1]. Diagnosis classi-
fies the sick patient as having or not having a particular
disease. Historically, diagnosis was regarded as the pri-
mary guide to treatment and prognosis (“what is likely
to happen in the future”), and is still considered the core
component of clinical practice [2].
This traditional model now has to meet the demand
for health care to deliver demonstrable quality. Changes
in clinical practice must be justified by better outcomes,
as valued by patients, or more efficient and safer delivery
of health care. The usefulness of diagnostic and treat-
ment decisions, and the value of new tests and interven-
tions, are judged by whether patients classified with
diagnosed disease do better and those classified without
disease come to no harm [3].
This requires information about patient prognosis –
the likelihood of future outcomes in patients with a
given disease or health condition. Prognosis research
aims to understand the likelihood of different outcomes,
* Correspondence: p.r.croft@keele.ac.uk
1Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre, Research Institute for Primary
Care and Health Sciences, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire ST5 5BG, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2015 Croft et al.; licensee BioMed Central. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
unless otherwise stated.
Croft et al. BMC Medicine  (2015) 13:20 
DOI 10.1186/s12916-014-0265-4
which factors predict these likelihoods, how best to esti-
mate an individual’s likelihood of different outcomes,
and how this information can be used to target interven-
tions and improve outcomes [4].
Importantly, patient prognosis is influenced by more
than disease diagnosis and diagnosis-driven treatment.
Among women with advanced breast cancer, for exam-
ple, treatment responsiveness and toxicity as well as
survival are informed by their physical wellbeing and ap-
petite prior to the start of treatment [5]. The multiplicity
of biological, clinical, and social factors that inform the
likelihood of an individual’s future outcome challenges
the idea that prognosis and treatment selection are ex-
clusively determined by diagnosis. Guidelines on statin
use, for example, have shifted from “treat hypercholes-
terolaemia” to “treat the risk of adverse cardiovascular
outcomes”, emphasising the continuous and multifactor-
ial nature of risk for adverse outcomes that might be
lowered by intervention [6,7].
In this paper, we consider the case for prognosis to re-
place diagnosis as the framework for clinical decision-
making. For some patients, especially those with acute
illness or injury, a prognosis-based model will be domi-
nated by diagnostic disease-based information. For many
others, notably patients with long-term ill-health, heal-
thy people classified as having a risk-based condition,
and persons in screening programmes, a model framed
by prognosis would integrate diagnostic and treatment
information with other data relevant to future health,
and place evidence about the probability of future out-
comes, and how to improve those outcomes, at the fore-
front of clinical thinking and decision-making. Such a
model has the potential to reduce or avoid overdiagnosis
[8,9] and to promote incorporation of quantitative esti-
mates of future outcomes into shared decision-making
with patients in clinical practice [6]. We also discuss po-
tential downsides and limitations of a shift to prognosis-
based clinical practice.
Discussion
A useful diagnosis is defined by patient prognosis
Diagnosis classifies sick people into groups defined by
disease and pathology [10]. The frameworks to ex-
plain illness have expanded from pathoanatomical to
physiological-biochemical-psychological and, more re-
cently, genetic-molecular models, but the basic con-
cept of diagnosis has not changed. Diagnosis provides
clinicians with the means to organise and interpret a
range of information provided by patient symptoms,
signs, tests, and investigations as the basis for decision-
making.
The importance of diagnosis seems most obvious when
there is an available treatment which works by directly tar-
geting a specific disease.
Example: The primary care physician faced with the
common clinical problem of a child with fever is
concerned not to miss rare but serious diagnoses
needing specific treatments. A correct diagnosis of
meningococcal meningitis will dictate life-saving,
targeted antibiotic treatment. Also, correctly classifying
the majority of children with fever who have self-
limiting infections will underpin appropriate
reassurance, and avoid antimicrobial therapy and
potentially harmful specialist investigations.
Diagnosis and disease mechanisms inform the deci-
sions in this example, yet patient prognosis is the under-
lying concern. The concern is firstly to correctly identify
the few children who, unless they receive urgent treat-
ment targeted at a specific disease, have a high likeli-
hood of poor outcome (disease diagnosis being a highly
effective way to improve prognosis in these individuals)
and, secondly, to allow the many children with fever
who have a high likelihood of a good outcome to recover
without disease-targeted interventions.
The science of diagnosis recognises the uncertainty cli-
nicians face as they attempt to classify people with and
without disease. In primary care, this drives the search
for optimal combinations of symptoms and signs to iden-
tify and select patients with high probability of the target
condition to undergo further tests. The usefulness of this
strategy is judged by prognosis – are outcomes improved
in those selected for testing, and is it safe to avoid tests in
persons with low disease probability because their progno-
sis would not be altered by the test?
Example: Urinary tract infections in children present
in ways which overlap with many other acute
childhood illnesses. The diagnostic challenge is to
identify children whose urine contains bacteria so that
antibiotic therapy can be rationalised and kept to a
safe minimum. Carrying out high quality microbiology
on urine samples from all acutely unwell children is
difficult and inefficient. Research seeks clinical
prediction rules that select children with an increased
probability of bacteriologically-positive infection for
urine testing [11], using information including
sociodemographics and urinary and non-urinary
symptoms. The question is whether application of the
prediction rule, plus targeted testing and treatment of
identified bacteriologically-positive children, improves
outcomes for those who are tested and does no harm
to those who are not.
This example illustrates how a stratified process for
diagnosis may support clinical decisions, including avoi-
ding unnecessary investigation and treatment in pa-
tients with low disease probability. The usefulness of this
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process is defined by the prognosis of all children engaged
in it.
Diagnostic research emphasises the need for evidence
that new tests improve outcomes before adoption in
practice [12]. This can be done by linking advances in
disease detection with existing evidence for treatment ef-
ficacy, or by demonstrating that the new test lowers
costs or improves safety. However, it may be necessary
to evaluate whether the new diagnostic process changes
decision making, improves outcomes in persons classi-
fied with the disease, and avoids unnecessary treatment
in persons without the disease [13]. The justification for
novelty in diagnostic practice is whether it improves pa-
tient prognosis. Evidence for this may be lacking.
Example: A new source of information about suspected
coronary heart disease is cardiovascular magnetic
resonance imaging. Medical imaging is the fastest
growing physician-ordered service in the US Medicare
system [14]. The most important indicator for
cardiovascular imaging in Europe is suspected
coronary artery disease and myocardial ischaemia
[15]. The safety of cardiovascular imaging and its
potential to change the diagnosis are established, but
whether its use improves patient outcomes has not
been addressed, although trials are underway [16].
Evidence is needed since “…as an imaging community
we have failed to demonstrate the added value of
cardiac imaging in terms of improved quality of care
or improved outcomes” [17].
This demand for prognostic evidence of improved out-
comes when evaluating new diagnostic information poses
substantial challenges of feasibility for the necessary re-
search, especially for studies of long-term impact and cost;
this is a limitation on the prognostic model. Information
science, and its expanding reservoir of data linked to pa-
tient outcomes, will need to drive novel methods to ad-
dress these questions such as modelling of long-term
outcomes by combining data from cross-sectional diag-
nostic and short-term effectiveness studies.
Prognosis identifies overdiagnosis
In all three examples above, the usefulness of diagnosis
is defined by evidence about patient prognosis, but
the clinical process remains focused on disease. The
assumption is that identifying individuals with disease
optimises their outcome. This assumption may not al-
ways be justified.
In the past, disease diagnosis often occurred without
effective treatments or any evidence that diagnosis chan-
ged outcomes. Even now the culture of ‘diagnosis as an
end in itself ’, without evidence of its prognostic or prac-
tical value for patients, may at best be unnecessary and
at worst do harm. There is increasing concern about such
‘overdiagnosis’, in which a pathological lesion or state is
identified, and the patient is defined as having a disease, in
the absence of any evidence that this state either leads to a
poor outcome or defines a pathway of investigation or
treatment that clearly advantages the patient. Evidence is
accruing that overdiagnosis is not only inefficient in its
creation of unnecessary health care, but harmful in the ef-
fects which the investigations and treatments generated
can have on patients [8].
Example: A patient presenting with mild urinary
symptoms has prostate cancer diagnosed by a test and
histopathology. The grading of his cancer places him
at one end of the spectrum of risk of future poor
outcome, with a low probability that he will die
prematurely and evidence that surgical treatment
would not alter this probability [18]. Furthermore, if
surgically treated, there is a risk of undesirable
outcomes such as reduced genito-urinary function. The
evidence base to inform clinical, personal, and policy
decisions needs to show how use of diagnostic tests to
identify and classify prostate cancer links to outcomes
with and without treatment [8,9], i.e., decisions should
be informed by evidence about patient prognosis. We
cannot assume the pursuit of diagnosis and disease is
beneficial in the absence of evidence about future
outcomes.
Overdiagnosis flourishes in the vacuum created by a
culture of ‘underprognosis’, i.e., lack of critical enquiry,
information, or evidence about the likely future benefits
or harms of identifying a condition as an abnormal dis-
ease state. A prognostic framework for clinical practice
would help to resist evidence-free diagnostic novelty.
Prognostic evidence highlights when overenthusiastic
search for pathology leads to irrelevant treatments and
needless anxiety, such as disc anomalies on MRI of the
spine [19], but can reassure people who need neither active
intervention nor a diagnosis, and identify those in whom
diagnosis does guide decisions that improve outcomes.
Concerns about overdiagnosis are often generated by
screening programmes which diagnose early or latent
disease in healthy people. There is debate, for example,
about how much breast cancer screening programmes
reduce premature mortality, and to what extent the na-
ture and rate of adverse consequences are acceptable,
i.e., how population prognosis changes as a result of a
screening programme [20]. Overdiagnosis of lesions
that do not confer poor prognosis or affect future out-
comes is an important adverse consequence of breast
cancer screening because of the implications of un-
necessary anxiety, investigation, and treatment in pa-
tients with such lesions.
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Patient prognosis is determined by more than disease
diagnosis
The traditional model of clinical practice assumes that
prognosis is inferred only after the diagnosis has been
made – presence or absence of disease determines prog-
nosis. However, in the absence of effective treatment, cli-
nicians have always understood that prognosis can be
highly variable in persons with a particular diagnosis.
Example: A physician, working during a typhoid
outbreak in the UK in the 1930’s, provided care for the
many who recovered and the few who did not [21]. He
wrote “A patient with typhoid fever usually inclines to
recovery: it is a natural proclivity in one with the
disease”. Diagnosis characterised the sick group but
was less important to the people involved than
knowledge that most were likely to get better.
The science of prognosis is concerned with improving
the precision, accuracy, and usefulness of measures of
likely future outcomes. Modelling an individual’s prog-
nosis can draw on the full range of relevant and available
information, both clinical and non-clinical. In the diag-
nostic model, this may appear as an interaction of dis-
ease with non-disease factors in determining outcome
such as the influence of psychological health on surgical
outcomes. Prognosis offers an alternative starting point
with wider incorporation of factors relevant to patient
outcomes than diagnosis alone.
Example: The potential benefit of early diagnosis of
type 2 diabetes was investigated in persons identified
from primary care records as being at risk of the
condition [22]. Outcomes were compared between
groups invited and not invited for diabetes screening.
Management of persons diagnosed with diabetes in
the screened group focused on improving prognosis
by attempting to reduce their risk of future
cardiovascular disease, targeting blood pressure, and
cholesterol as well as blood glucose. Ten-year mortality
was similar in the screened and unscreened groups.
One explanation for this finding was that systematic
cardiovascular risk factor management in the screened
population was only offered to persons diagnosed with
diabetes rather than to everyone invited for screening.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion in this example
that the focus on diagnosis has obstructed a coherent
approach to improving outcomes for people at elevated
risk of future cardiovascular events. A focus on improving
prognosis regardless of ‘diagnosis’, with blood glucose as
one contributor to the probability of poor outcomes, inte-
grated with other risk measures to derive estimates of in-
dividual prognosis, would provide a less selective, more
productive approach to improving health outcomes. Such
an approach may be particularly relevant for patients with
multiple health problems.
Example: Although a person with multiple diseases
will benefit from optimal care for each separate
condition by disease-based specialists, the
multimorbidity state itself contributes to poor
prognosis, for example a higher probability of
unplanned hospitalisation, and outcomes are
improved if there is additional integrated care from
generalists [23]. However, much multimorbidity
concerns risk-based measures (blood sugar, kidney
function, blood pressure), which are more usefully
considered as continuous variables rather than disease
states [6]. In constructing prognostic models to support
decision-making for people with multimorbidity, such
biological measures can be integrated with subjective
measures, such as mood state, pain severity, and
mobility limitation, to create quantitative estimates
of prognosis to inform care for people with multiple
long-term conditions.
Traditional disease-based classification systems are
being challenged by the quest for new ways to classify
persons with multimorbidity and to incorporate new
information about health, such as genomics, into such
systems [24]. This new information is undermining the
idea that medicine only starts when there is a diagnos-
tic label. Biomedical diagnoses have also traditionally
encouraged isolated disease-based measures of outcome,
such as normal blood glucose, to assess the success of
health care. The acceptance that patient-focused mea-
sures, such as improved or maintained social participation,
are realistic and desirable outcomes of health care for pa-
tients with long-term conditions [25] is subverting the
idea that good prognosis is only judged by disease cure.
Not “have you got it or not?” but “how much have
you got?”
Clinical decisions are often dichotomous (does this per-
son have something serious or not? should this patient
be allowed to drive or not?). Diagnosis as “either you
have it or you don’t” (is it a heart attack or not?) aligns
with such yes/no decisions, but the diagnostic process it-
self is often more probabilistic and uncertain – a series
of decisions, guided at each stage by the changed prob-
ability of a diagnosis being present or not and designed
to gradually reduce uncertainty [26]. However, this pro-
cess still assumes there is an underlying dichotomous dis-
ease state (yes or no); this assumption may be flawed.
The underlying ‘disease’ is often a continuous distri-
bution of probability for future health states. Diagnosis
is then not “have you got it?” but “how much of it have
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you got?” Gale [27], for example, has argued that there
is no single pathology underlying diabetes, and that its
identification and diagnosis subsumes much heterogen-
eity, given blood glucose is a continuously distributed
variable. Vickers et al. [6] highlight that many such risk
variables are artificially dichotomised and treated as dis-
ease states rather than as sources of information about
probability of future events, which provide a quantitative
estimate of individual risk for particular outcomes.
It can be argued that diagnosis does incorporate vari-
ability under the concept of disease severity. The con-
tinuous distribution of blood pressure, for example,
aligns with severity of the ‘disease’ (or unhealthy state).
The diagnostic paradigm, however, focuses on classifica-
tion and misclassification of ‘hypertension’. The prog-
nostic approach more naturally accommodates the idea
of severity by relating increasing levels of blood pressure
to contrasting outcomes.
A potential downside of the prognostic approach is
whether clinical models in the real world can incorpor-
ate the continuous nature and variability of risk of future
avoidable outcomes into decision making. Calculation
of prognostic likelihoods and treatment responsiveness
can combine all relevant information, but validation
and translation of prognostic models into practice often
relies still on categorisation (high-medium-low risk of a
particular outcome) to drive stratified care [28,29]. Evi-
dence about the clinical usefulness of such new cate-
gorisations is essential – prognostic classification for its
own sake should not replace diagnosis for its own sake
[30]. Nor should individual patient prognosis be a static
classification in time – it needs to be updated with re-
cent predictor values, or a profile of values over time,
to reflect how clinical practice works in the real world
by using new information and repeat consultations to
modify treatment.
There are practical challenges to introducing an
information-rich prognosis framework for a real-world
clinical practice already struggling with volumes of
guidelines, decision-aids, and protocols of care. Techno-
logical and statistical advances to make calculation and
presentation of prognostic information more accessible
and research into ways in which health care professionals
and patients can better assimilate, use, and share prognos-
tic information could help to meet these challenges.
The pros and cons of labelling people
Diagnosis and disease do not represent unchanging truth.
Historians and sociologists have described how apparently
robust diagnostic entities, such as coronary heart disease,
conceal a history of shifting boundaries and definitions
[10,31,32]. These shifts reflect not only scientific ad-
vance and expanding knowledge (e.g., the identification
of Helicobacter as a cause of peptic ulcer), but also the
recurring need to organise medical knowledge in prac-
tical and pragmatic ways to aid clinical and public health
decision-making. However, it is equally clear that such
shifts are taken up, shaped, and driven by professional am-
bition, pharmaceutical industry interests, and the com-
mercial drive for profit, and that they influence and are
influenced by changing social context and cultural norms,
for example, changes in mental illness classification. “Even
US law now recognizes that disease is no longer a unique
collection of symptoms equalling a given condition, but ra-
ther a constellation of current symptoms, previous expo-
sures, and future potential manifestations, all of which
make the art of diagnosis even more precarious” [33].
Particular challenges occur when no pathological ex-
planation for the patient’s symptoms is currently available.
Example: Chronic fatigue syndrome is a ‘contested
diagnosis’ [31]. The drive for pathological explanations
led to its initial characterisation in the UK as myalgic
encephalomyelitis, with little evidence that such a
pathological inflammatory process was responsible for
the symptoms. The failure of clinical science to identify
a mechanism to support the diagnosis means that
patients with chronic fatigue often perceive their
symptoms are not believed. The outcome of patients
with symptoms of persistent fatigue, however, is of high
relevance, regardless of the biomedical status of the
syndrome.
Whilst biomedical science often ignores such problems,
patients believe biomedicine could and should come up
with the answer [32]. Prognostic classification provides a
practical way forward. Modifiable patient characteristics
that contribute to poor prognosis in chronic fatigue (e.g.,
low activity level, depression, insomnia) provide targets
for intervention in the absence of a definitive biome-
dical explanation. Targeted exercise programmes, for
example, improve prognosis in persons at risk of per-
sisting problems [34].
Diagnosis, however, has functions other than revealing
pathological truth. A diagnostic label provides the pa-
tient with meaning and value for symptoms regardless of
whether these have a biomedical explanation [31]. Diag-
nosis legitimates the sickness state, and gives access to
support and benefits [32]. Prognostic statements may
not provide the same immediate value as a diagnostic
label, and some patients may be more interested in ‘have
I got high cholesterol?’ than in the language of risk. A
culture is needed in which clinicians and patients can
work together on improving outcomes in the absence of
the apparent certainty provided by a diagnostic label.
A hazard of applying a prognostic model in clinical
practice relates to the very thing it is designed to re-
duce, namely over-medicalization of daily life. We have
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discussed how excessive diagnostic zeal in the absence of
improved outcomes for the patient, and the wish to find a
pathology to explain every symptom, and the application
of diagnostic labels to asymptomatic risk factors, may all
lead to ineffective and inefficient care, and harmful side-
effects for the patient. The potential for a prognostic
model of care to solve these problems has to be weighed
against the possibility that such a model may create its
own version of over-medicalization. Aronowitz points to
healthy individuals locked rather fearfully into long-term
surveillance of risk markers, believing this is the way to
ensure continuing good prognosis, even if their risk of
death and other adverse outcomes is low [35]. The anx-
ieties, and unnecessary and inefficient health care, and
commercial and professional interests involved look re-
markably similar to those associated with unevidenced
diagnostic excess. The resolution lies in demanding high
quality evidence of what is and is not useful for improving
outcomes, i.e., pursuit of the best prognostic evidence as
the scientific basis for resisting excessive medicalization.
Prognosis provides a natural framework for modern
clinical practice
Disease diagnosis is a crucial component of modern medi-
cine but fails to provide a sufficient framework for a mod-
ern clinical practice which must incorporate variability in
individual patient risk of different outcomes, influences on
patient outcome which extend beyond disease, and avoi-
dance of harm; prognosis provides such a framework. Cli-
nicians often think in terms of prognosis, especially the
primary care physician who may start by judging if the pa-
tient is going to get better or not [36]. Decisions about in-
dividual patients in primary care are informed by available
evidence about likely future outcomes, and a clinician’s
own judgement on likely outcome has prognostic value
and helps to guide decision-making [37]. Shared explor-
ation and understanding between clinician and patient of
which outcomes are wanted or needed, achieved through
patients being able to voice their own priorities and
goals for care and treatment in the consultation, sup-
ports a prognostic framework for the clinical encounter,
particularly for the patient with long-term conditions
and multimorbidity [38].
Example: Evidence that clinicians and patients can
integrate disease-based explanation within a broader
framework of prognosis is provided by back pain.
Primary care practitioners undertake initial triage in
a diagnostic framework to identify rare underlying
conditions which have a poor immediate prognosis
unless treated (e.g., cord compression from a tumour).
Once these are excluded, the task diverts from diagnosis
and considers the clinical problem as the risk of poor
long-term outcomes (work loss, persistent pain). Activity
limitation, psychological distress, and capacity to cope
are used to classify people into prognostic categories that
drive treatment decisions [39]. The many at low risk of
a poor outcome are managed without referral or
investigation, whereas more intense care is targeted at
those with poorer prognosis. This exemplifies the
principle of ‘stratified care’. Use of this prognostic
approach to select back pain patients for different
treatment programmes was effective and cost effective
in a randomised controlled trial [40].
Such personalised medicine is likely to herald prefer-
ential expansion of prognostic modelling of individual
risk for future health outcomes over new diagnostic tests
of current disease status. However, research to inform
and justify a prognostic model of clinical practice is cru-
cial, including the important uncertainties about the ap-
plication of this model represented by clinical, patient,
and public understanding of risk and probability.
Summary
We propose that prognosis can now provide the frame-
work in which clinicians and researchers organise evidence
and information to support decisions about management.
This extends calls for a risk-centred approach to many syn-
dromes and chronic conditions [6] and parallels proposals
that public health should be organised around achievable
outcomes rather than disease categories [41]. Such a
framework shifts the focus of clinical practice to im-
proving outcomes for patients in their total biological,
psychological, and social environment and away from
an exclusive and narrow focus on underlying disease as
the determinant of outcome.
Although biomedical diagnosis is often a crucial driver
of treatment selection, especially in acute life-threatening
illness such as infection and trauma, diagnostic labelling
and subgrouping for many ill people is about providing
prognostic information to support decisions about tar-
geted individual long-term care. A broader prognostic
framework could integrate such information with evidence
about other pathophysiological, psychological, behavioural,
and environmental factors that affect patient outcomes, to
avoid overdiagnosis and support doctors and their patients
in probability-based decision-making in clinical practice.
Prognosis is not a panacea for all the problems we have
discussed in relation to diagnosis, and there must be con-
tinuing debate about the benefits, value, limits, harms,
and costs of medicalization and medical care. However,
because prognostic classification incorporates a much
wider range of information than diagnosis and disease
factors alone, and because such information is expand-
ing rapidly in volume and availability [42], prognosis
can provide a realistic, practical, and useful framework
for clinical and public health practice.
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